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Abstract: The notion of accountability in nonprofits suggests that these organisations should disclose
financial and non-financial practices following a holistic model. In practice, the interest of both
managers and researchers has focused primarily on donors and financial disclosures, for funding
and methodological reasons respectively. From the perspective of impact investment, all of them,
government, beneficiaries, private donors, managers and volunteers are expected to make their
decisions based on non-financial information as investors expecting social returns. However, to what
extent does project information that demonstrates that the non-profit organisation has achieved its
social mission actually matter? The main objective of this paper is to analyse whether the donations
received by non-governmental organisations NGOs are related to the information disclosed on the
projects undertaken. We perform our analysis separately for individual, private and public donors.
Our results show that public donors are more interested in financial disclosures, private donors find
information about outcomes and impacts to be most useful and individual donors do not tend to use
non-financial information when it comes to making decisions about whether to donate or not.
Keywords: donors; nonprofits; social projects; non-financial information
1. Introduction
To what extent does project information that demonstrates that a non-profit organization has
achieved its social mission actually matter? There is a great deal of literature on the importance
of financial information [1–4], due to the availability of financial data, but there few studies have
addressed the usefulness of non-financial information, especially that which refers to the portfolio of
non-profit projects and activities but paradoxically, these are their real raison d’être.
Nonprofits, unlike for-profit organisations, rely primarily on their social dimension [5]. The projects
undertaken by NGOs always pursue social and/or environmental goals, so these projects make a
positive contribution to sustainability. Indeed, their stakeholders could be considered as investors in
social/environmental impact investors [5]. “Sustainability reporting offers a number of financial and
social advantages, including social impact that builds trust towards the idea of civil society and its
funders” [6]. Accountability and transparency should involve all stakeholders in a balanced manner,
in addition to enabling continuous learning and disclosing financial information about projects and
impacts to the same extent for all stakeholders [7,8].
However, transparency and accountability practices are hierarchical [9], strongly marked by a
dependence on financial resources and oriented mainly towards donors [10]. Sometimes, this pressure
even encourages financial misreporting [11–13].
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Several works have studied the usefulness of financial and non-financial information for
fundraising purposes [4,14–16]. With respect to non-financial information, the literature reveals
the usefulness for donors of performance disclosure (i.e., information about mission, vision, targets,
strategic plan, projects, . . . ). There is a positive relationship between the disclosure of this information
and the amount of donations received by the organisation [17,18]. Nevertheless, none of the previous
studies have focused on the relationship between project information and donations. Given that
this information is what gives the true measure of the degree of fulfilment of the social mission, it is
surprising how little interest the analysis of the usefulness of this information has aroused, mainly due
to the non-availability of data.
In order to shed light on the usefulness of information for donor decision-making, this study
specifically analyses data on projects and activities developed by non-profits, unlike most research
based on financial data. Specifically, the main objective of this paper is to analyse whether the donations
received by NGOs are related to the information disclosed on the projects undertaken. In this way,
we can infer the usefulness for donors of the information disclosed about these projects.
To answer this question, this study examines the corporate reports of non-profits listed by the
Spanish Development NGO Coordinator (CONGDE) in 2015. Other authors [18,19] have analysed the
relationship between donations and the information disclosed by NGOs in different countries (Italy,
UK and the USA). All of them have considered the set of donors as a whole. We, however, analysed the
three categories of donors separately: individual, private and public. This is one of the contributions
of our paper.
The results show that this information is useful for public donors, especially the financial content,
while private donors prefer to rely on corporate information related to the outcomes and impact of the
project. Conversely, individual donors do not take this corporate information into consideration.
The rest of this work is structured as follows: the next section provides the theoretical framework,
the following sections present the research design, results and discussion and finally conclusions and
avenues for future research.
2. Information for Decision-Making in Non-Profits: Theoretical Framework and Development
of Hypotheses
2.1. Motivations for Financial and Non-Financial Information Disclosure
Several conceptual theories try to explain how non-profits disclose information among their
stakeholders taking into account their primarily social mission: institutional theory, legitimacy theory,
resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory [7,20,21]. These theories also help to understand
the different approach to accountability (holistic vs. hierarchical), its prevalence in financial disclosure
practices as well as the transparency policy [7,22].
Accountability and transparency are concepts that are closely related to each other [22–26] and to the
decision-making process in nonprofits. They require both robust financial information and non-financial
information covering activities and projects [27]. As pointed out by Ebrahim [24], due to their special
nature, nonprofits are expected to be accountable for multiple purposes (finances, governance,
performance and mission) to different stakeholders (government, beneficiaries, private donors,
board members, volunteers, employees and citizens).
These stakeholders donate, invest or lend not only money but also time, prestige, etc. [5,28,29].
However, although they expect different returns, “social impact is the goal that unifies them”.
Furthermore, if the concept of investment is expanded “by expanding the range of returns that
investors seek and the resources they invest”, they can also be considered as investors which means
that they need information beyond financial data for making decisions [5] (pp. 6–27).
The entity should try to match the expectations of all its stakeholders as regards information
(stakeholder theory), without prioritising financial resources providers (donors). In addition, it must
be taken into account that nonprofits rely heavily on their reputation to ensure their legitimacy
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(legitimacy theory) and to protect both their financial sources (resource dependence theory) [30] and
non-financial resources (such as time, expertise or reputation).
Incorporating all the above requires nonprofits to disclose both credible financial information,
which is the most abundant, available and standardised, as well as reliable non-financial information
(i.e., projects and social impacts) [31]. In short, this multiple stakeholder perspective requires an
integrated or holistic accountability model [7,22].
So far, we have considered the theory, the “what should be”. However, in practice, as donations are
the main source of funding for most nonprofits, these entities have mostly implemented a hierarchical
and myopic accountability practice focused on donors and financial indicators [9], which leads to
information asymmetries among different stakeholders [12,29]. In other words, disclosure of financial
information prevails over non-financial information.
After analysing the (theoretical) reasons for nonprofits to disclose both financial and non-financial
information, the (real) practice of prioritizing financial disclosure, we should now look at the motivations
on which stakeholders base their decision-making.
2.2. Information Needs for Decision-Making
Broadly speaking, government, beneficiaries, private donors, board members, CEO and other
managers, volunteers and society, in general, are the stakeholders identified in the literature [12,25,29].
From a functional point of view, each of them needs information: executives for decision-making,
social workers for professional development, target groups for service improvement, funders for
resourcing, regulators for accountability and society for legitimacy. From the broadest perspective of
impact investment [5], as investors awaiting social performance, all of them are expected to make their
decisions based largely on non-financial information (i.e., activities, projects and impacts). However,
behind the philanthropic motives, there are also particular reasons that justify the different behaviours
of the stakeholders. Basically, the studies explore the behaviour of donors and managers. Less interest
is given to beneficiaries (as receivers of the activities and projects funded by donors) [29].
Research on the motivations of donors has attracted a great deal of attention. The studies
highlight the existence of a wide range of factors behind the decision to donate. These factors can
be classified as (a) factors of individuals and (b) factors of the organisation. With regard to the
former, Schloderer et al. [32] stressed the importance of sociodemographic characteristics (gender,
age, education and income). In this vein, Kottasz [33] points out that the higher the individual’s
education level, the higher the probability that he or she will make a donation. Mesch et al. [34] show
that women are more altruistic and more likely to donate than men. Other papers ([35,36]) show that
younger individuals are more likely to donate than older people. Bekkers and Wiepking [37] identify
eight mechanisms as the most important forces driving donations (individual donors): awareness of
need, solicitation, costs and benefits, altruism, reputation, psychological benefits, values and efficacy.
Epstein and Yuthas [5], point to four investment returns that motivate investors: identity (reciprocity,
satisfaction and reputation), process (knowledge, experience and relationships) and financial and social
impact (societal and environmental).
As regards organisational factors, Scholderer et al. [32] highlighted the importance of the
organisation’s reputation. Parsons [4,14] showed evidence of the role of efficiency, effectiveness,
financial stability and financial accounting information when making a donation decision. Trussel and
Parsons [38] added that donations also depend on both the reputation of the organisation and the amount
of information provided to donors. Harris and Neely [39] found evidence that donors incorporate
third-party rating information (based on financial measures) into their donation decision process,
and nonprofits with consistently good ratings receive higher donations. Nevertheless, other researchers
such as [40] considered other aspects to be of greater utility to donors, such as familiarity, word of mouth
or the visibility of the nonprofit in the community. Yan and Sloan [41] focused on the interaction between
employee compensation and financial performance on donations and found that high compensations
have a detrimental effect on donations except when financial performance is strong. Calabrese [42]
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showed that donations are also sensitive to the accumulation of wealth, so future contributions are
negatively affected when wealth is perceived as excessive.
As can be seen, the vast majority of these studies on organisational factors underlying the decision
to donate are based on financial information available in financial reports. This provides clear evidence
of the utility of financial information in the donation decision process. In fact, the influence of this
information is so significant, or at least managers perceive it that way, that they feel encouraged to
manage financial disclosures in order to increase donations [11–13,43]. Nevertheless, few studies have
addressed donation decision-making with non-financial data and their results are also inconclusive [14].
Within this field, hardly any studies have used data about the activities, projects and impacts that
meet the needs of beneficiaries, even though they represent the core of the organisation. This research
attempts to fill this gap.
Research on donors’ perceptions reveals their interest in both financial and non-financial
information [4,14,16]. Waniak-Michalak and Zarzycka [15] showed that Polish donors consider
information about the organisation’s goals and descriptions of its projects to be more useful than
financial information. Saxton et al. find [17] a positive relationship between the level of donations
made to US non-profits and the quantity of information these organisations provide through the
web. These authors point out that the non-financial information disclosed (mission, vision, goals,
strategic plans, outputs or other performance) is positively linked to donations, whilst no such
relationship has been evidenced for financial information. In the same vein, Leardini et al. [18] find
a similar association for US environmental nonprofits. However, these works take the disclosed
information as a whole. They do not consider any kind of information about the segments that
compound this information. In particular, they do not use information about activities and projects
undertaken by the organisation. Therefore, empirical evidence that proves the influence of the
information about activities and projects and their impacts on the donors’ decision-making is lacking.
The question is therefore clear: To what extent is non-financial information on activities and projects
useful to donors?
2.3. Individual, Private and Public Donors
Organisations have stakeholders with different interests and objectives [44,45], which accounts
for different information needs for decision-making. This diversity is also evident within the same
group, as is the case of donors [13]. Donation decision-making differs depending on the willingness
and ability of donors to search, interpret and judge the information disclosed. Based on this, [13] we
distinguish between two different categories: less sophisticated donors and sophisticated donors.
Less sophisticated donors tend to be individual donors, who generally have less capacity to
interpret financial information. Needless to say, there are also people who donate large sums of money.
However, they usually do so indirectly, through intermediaries (trusts, foundations, or, in general
terms, organisations). Therefore, we consider the latter (hereinafter referred to as Private Donors) as
sophisticated donors. We assume that these Private Donors are backed by a team (as are Public Donors)
that can interpret and judge the information disclosed by NGOs.
For small donors, the incremental benefit to be gained from seeking information about nonprofits
in order to determine where to deposit their money is relatively low; consequently, they tend to
disregard financial information when it comes to deciding on their contributions [46].
Empirical evidence on the usefulness of non-financial information for individual donors is
controversial and inconclusive. Waniak-Michalak and Zarzycka [15] point out that Polish individual
donors focus on non-financial information, mainly descriptive information about objectives and
projects, when selecting an organisation to donate to. On the other hand, Buchheit and Parsons [47]
and Parsons [4] evidence that non-financial information (service, efforts and achievements reporting)
has no significant influence on actual donations.
Since the evidence is not conclusive, we based our work on the contributions of [4,46,47] and
therefore we do not expect individual donors to incorporate detailed non-financial information in
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their decisions to donate money. Rather, they act on the basis of more personal and emotional factors,
in line with those noted by [37] awareness of need, solicitation, costs and benefits, altruism, reputation,
psychological benefits, values and efficacy [40], familiarity, word of mouth or the visibility of the
nonprofit in the community. In accordance with the foregoing, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The amount of donations from individual donors is not related to the information disclosed
about projects. Therefore, this information is not useful for less sophisticated donors.
Private Donors and Public Donors give larger amounts and usually have greater human and
technical resources than small donors, which means they have a greater capacity to interpret complex
financial information and can be more sophisticated in their strategies [13]. This reasoning applies to
non-financial information covering activities and projects to the full technical, financial and impact
extent [31]. Corporations, foundations and grantors of legacies are more likely to study charities before
donating than other individuals [46] and public donors are governmental agencies that must monitor
nonprofits, given the public nature of the resources donated. This greater ability to process complex
data is expected to allow sophisticated donors to incorporate non-financial information on activities
and projects when making donations. Sophisticated donors do not want the funds provided to be
wasted on high administration and advertising costs [48].
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The amount of donations from private donors is related to the information disclosed about
projects. Therefore, this information is useful for the decision-making of private donors.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The amount of donations from public donors is related to the information disclosed about
projects. Therefore, this information is useful for the decision-making of public donors.
3. Research Design
3.1. Data
The study examines 72 corporate reports of nonprofits from the Spanish Development NGO
Coordinator including top organisations. In 2015, a total of 76 non-governmental organisations were
members of CONGDE. Four organisations were excluded due to a lack of data. We made a database
with information about the projects undertaken by NGOs and their financial data. We obtained the
data about these projects from corporate reports, available on the organisation’s website, and the
financial data from the CONGDE website.
3.2. Models
To test the hypotheses posited in the previous section, the following models (1) and (2) were used.
Model 1:
ln Dt = β0 + β1TIt−1 + β2 ln It−1 + β3PRICEt−1 + β4FEt−1 + β5CONCENt−1 + εt (1)
Model 2:
ln Dt = β0 + β1TEC_It−1 + β2FIN_It−1 + β3SCOIt−1 + β4 ln It−1 + β5PRICEt−1
+β6FEt−1 + β7CONCENt−1 + εt
(2)
where the dependent variable, Dt, denotes the funds donated in t. We use this notation to represent
three different variables, depending on the analysed donor: individual donors (IND_Dt), private donors
(PRIV_Dt) or public donors (PUB_Dt). TIt−1 is the transparency index based on information about
the different projects carried out in t−1. See below its calculation procedure. It−1 is the amount of
income obtained in t−1. PRICEt−1 is the total expense in t−1 divided by programme expense in t−1.
FEt−1 is the total fundraising expense in t−1 divided by the total expense in t−1. CONCENt−1 is the
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concentration index in t−1. ln represents the Napierian logarithm. DIt−1 represents the informational
dimension of the transparency index in t−1.
Model 2 was estimated using each of the three dimensions separately: TEC_I, FIN_I and SCO_I,
the information index of the technical dimension, of the financial dimension and of the scope dimension,
respectively. See below the meaning and the calculation procedure for these dimensions.
The models were estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).
3.3. Dependent Variable
The hypotheses were tested using the funds donated by the three kinds of donors as dependent
variables. For Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable used was the amount of donations by individual
donors, either through fundraising campaigns, regular donations or patronage payments. Hypothesis 2
was tested by taking the total donations made by companies both by granting subsidies and by
contributions. Lastly, Hypothesis 3 was tested by taking the funds received by NGOs in the form of
subsidies from public administration bodies.
3.4. Independent Variables
In order to measure the degree of disclosure of information about the projects, we used a modified
version of the index proposed by [31]. The index of these authors incorporates information about
projects concerning three dimensions: technical, financial and scope. However, the index only reflects
the level of information transparency in a global manner, it does not take into consideration the
measurement of each of the three dimensions separately. The index was therefore modified to analyse
the contribution made by each of these dimensions to the transparency index. Accordingly, the modified
index is as follows (3):
TI =
∑NTD
i = 1 TDIi/NTD +
∑NFD
j = 1 FDI j/NFD +
∑NSD
k = 1 SDIk/NSD
D
(3)














TNP is the number of projects carried out by the NGO within the period and NPT(i), NPF(j) and
NSP(k) represent the number of projects in which the NGO publishes information about the i-th,
j-th and k-th items of, respectively:
• The technical dimension: the level of information published by the NGO related to the description
of the projects carried out within the period.
• The financial dimension, which incorporates information about the financial aspects of each of
the projects.
• The scope dimension, which covers aspects of the outcomes and impacts of the projects.
• NTD, NFD and NsD are the numbers of items in each of the dimensions.
We used the items proposed by [31] to build the transparency index. Table 1 shows the items used
in each of the dimensions of the index.
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Table 1. Items analysed in the projects.
Dimension Item
Technical
• A description of the projects undertaken
• Information about the action to which the project belongs
• Information is provided about the geographical area in which the project is carried out
Financial
• Information about the amount of financial resources consumed by the project.
• Details of the different sources of funding for the project.
• Information about the amount donated to the project by each of the sources of funding.
• Information about the counterparty.
Scope
• Information about the beneficiaries of the project (qualitative information).
• Information about the beneficiaries of the project (quantitative information).
• Information about the direct and indirect beneficiaries of the project.
• Information about the social impact of the project.
The proposed index (3) will have a minimum value of 0 for those cases in which no information is
offered about the projects and a maximum value of 1 for maximum information disclosure. Additionally,
this index allows the separate assessment of the informational disclosure of each of the three different
dimensions, as expressions (7) to (9) show:
TEC_I =
∑NTD














Previous research has identified different factors that influence donors when it comes to making
donations to nonprofit organisations. In this regard, Trussel and Parsons [38] point out that the efficiency
of the allocation of resources to programmes, the organisation’s financial stability, reputation and
availability of information are factors that are related to the contributions donors make to nonprofits.
In the models estimated to test the different hypotheses (1) and (2), a control variable was introduced
for each of the factors highlighted by [38]. Efficiency was measured using the variable price of
output (PRICE), which is defined by [49] as the cost for a donor of buying one dollar of output for the
beneficiaries of the organisation. This variable PRICE is measured as the inverse of the programme ratio.
Thus, high values of these variables mean that a large part of the funds was devoted to administrative
management or fundraising instead of covering the true mission. Previous empirical studies [50–52]
offer evidence of a negative relationship between PRICE and donor contributions to non-governmental
organisations: on average the most efficient non-governmental organisations (small PRICE values)
present greater contributions than less efficient organisations (high PRICE values) [38].
The income concentration index (CONCEN) proposed by Tuckman and Chang [53] was used as a








where Fj are the funds obtained from each of the “k” types of funding sources, and TF is the total amount
of funding obtained in the period. This index reflects the degree of independence that nonprofits have
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on the types of funds received by these organisations. When the index has a value = 1 means that
the organisation finances itself with one source of funding. In contrast, when the value is close to
zero, the organisation has balanced funding through different sources. Chang and Tuckman [54] noted
that nonprofits that have diverse sources of income are more likely to be in a more stable (stronger)
financial position than those with highly concentrated sources of income. Parsons and Trussel [55]
showed evidence of a positive relationship between the degree of financial stability and the sum total
of the donations. Donors prefer organisations with a stable financial structure, even though they might
temporarily have financial problems.
Donors require information about the organisation’s mission and about the activities to which it
will devote their funds to. In this regard, [46,49,56] used fundraising expenditure as a proxy of the
information available, and found a positive relationship between this expenditure and the number of
donations. We used the percentage of expenditure on fundraising out of the total spending as a proxy
of the information available.
Lastly, size was taken as a proxy of reputation, as suggested by [38], using the sum total of income.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables included in the analysis. As can be seen,
the main source of funding of the NGOs are donations made by public organisations through subsidies
(2374 thousand euros on average), with donations from individuals being the other major source
of funding (2285 thousand euros on average). Contributions from private companies are of lesser
significance and amount to an average of 641 thousand euros. However, it should be noted, as shown in
Figure 1, that the vast majority of donations in the different modalities analysed (individual donations,
private donations and public donations) are concentrated in a small number of NGOs. Specifically,
90% of NGOs obtain only 17% of all individual donations, 27% of private donations and 25% of
public donations.
On average the transparency index (TI) of the activities is 0.52. NGOs report about half the total
maximum content that the index can have. It should also be noted that NGOs offer more information
about the technical dimension (mean TEC_I is 0.73), whereas the scope dimension is the one for which
the least information is disclosed (mean SCO_I is 0.39).
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients of the independent and control variables of the
models. It can be seen that the variables of the disclosure indexes for each of the dimensions (TEC_I,
FIN_I and SCO_I) are highly correlated with one another. Therefore, if we incorporate the three variables
jointly in the model it would introduce important multicollinearity problems. To prevent this issue
from occurring, each of these variables was introduced separately into model 2 in order to determine
the informational content of each of these informational dimensions. The other variables do not present
any important correlations that could have an effect by introducing a multicollinearity problem.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Min. 1st Q. Median Mean 3rd Q. P 90 Max SD
Tit−1 0 0.40 0.57 0.52 0.70 0.81 0.92 0.25
TEC_It−1 0 0.67 0.84 0.73 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33
FIN_It−1 0 0.25 0.59 0.53 0.75 0.97 1.00 0.32
SCO_It−1 0 0.00 0.39 0.32 0.50 0.63 1.00 0.27
PRICEt−1 1 1.08 1.16 1.33 1.26 1.53 5.74 0.75
FEt−1 0 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.57 0.09
CONCENt−1 0.26 0.46 0.59 0.64 0.85 0.93 1.00 0.22
IND_Dt (in thousands of €) 0 21 145 2285 607 8768 26,910 5777
PRI_Dt (in thousands of €) 0 23 99 641 413 1373 13,283 1846
PUB_Dt (in thousands of €) 0 80 450 2374 1507 4155 77,594 9318
It−1 (in thousands of €) 1 682 1804 6364 5269 15,935 92,897 13,421
Note: definitions of variables—TIt−1 = the information transparency index regarding the different projects carried out in year t−1 calculated in accordance with expression (3).
TEC_It−1 = information index of the technical dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (7). FIN_It−1 = information index of the financial dimension in year t−1,
calculated in accordance with expression (8). SCO_It−1 = information index of the scope dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (9). PRICEt−1 = total expense to
programme expense ratio in year t−1. It−1 = total income obtained in year t−1. FEt−1 = total fundraising expense to total expense ratio in year t−1. CONCENt−1 = concentration index in
year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (10). IND_Dt = individual donations in current year, t. PRIV_Dt = private donations in current year, t. PUB_Dt = public donations in
current year, t.
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients.
Variables TIt−1 TEC_It−1 FIN_It−1 SCO_It−1 ln It−1 PRICEt−1 FEt−1 CONCENt−1
TIt−1 1 – – – – – – –
TEC_It−1 0.8290 *** 1 – – – – – –
FIN_It−1 0.8109 *** 0.4725 *** 1 – – – – –
SCO_It−1 0.7918 *** 0.5135 *** 0.4766 1 – – – –
ln It−1 −0.2789 * −0.2183. −0.2466 * −0.2062. 1 – – –
PRICEt−1 0.0981 0.1576 0.1063 −0.0250 −0.1438 1 – –
FEt−1 0.0272 0.1667 −0.0838 0.0192 0.1183 0.5567 *** 1 –
CONCENt−1 0.1096 −0.0014 0.1472 0.1035 0.0123 −0.2635 * −0.1804 1
Note: “***”, “**”, “*” and “.” represent significance at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. Definitions of variables—TIt−1 = the information transparency index regarding the different
projects carried out in year t−1 calculated in accordance with expression (3). TEC_It−1 = information index of the technical dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression
(7). FIN_It−1 = information index of the financial dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (8). SCO_It−1 = information index of the scope dimension in year t−1,
calculated in accordance with expression (9). PRICEt−1 = total expense to programme expense ratio in year t−1. ln It−1 = Napierian logarithm of the total income obtained in year t−1.
FEt−1 = total fundraising expense to total expense ratio in year t−1. CONCENt−1 = concentration index in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (10).
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4.2. Hypothesis 1. The Amount of Donations from Individual Donors is Not Related to the Information
Disclosed about Projects. Therefore, This Information is Not Useful for Less Sophisticated Donors
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the models used to test H1. Model 1 tests the relationship
between donations by individual donors (ln IND_D) and the degree of disclosure of information
about projects (TI) carried out by NGOs. The coefficient of the variable TI (−1.63) is not significant.
This indicates that disclosure of information about the projects is not related to the contribution of
funds by individual donors. Therefore, this information is not relevant for individual donors, as
H1 posits.
Table 4. Regression Results Individual Donations.
Variables
Mod l 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Intercept −1.34 −1.96 −1.75 −2.05
TIt−1 −1.63 – – –
TEC_It−1 – −0.70 – –
FIN_It−1 – – −1.42 –
SCO_It−1 – – – −1.04
ln It−1 1.02 *** 1.05 *** 1.03 *** 1.04 ***
PRICEt−1 −0.09 −0.12 −0.01 −0.17
FEt−1 11.21. 11.41. 10.17 11.31.
CONCENt−1 −2.94 −3.13 −2.81 −3.05
Adj. R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Note: p-values: “***”, “**”, “*” and “.” represent the significance at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.
Definitions of Variables—ln IND_Dt = Napierian logarithm of individual donations in current year, t. TIt−1 = the
information transparency index regarding the different projects carried out in year t−1, calculated in accordance
with expression (3). PRICEt−1 = total expense to programme expense ratio in year t−1. ln It−1 = Napierian logarithm
of the total income obtained in year t−1. FEt−1 = total fundraising expense to total expense ratio in year t−1.
CONCENt−1 = concentration index in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (10). TEC_It−1 = information
index of the technical dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (7). FIN_It−1 = information
index of the financial dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (8). SCO_It−1 = information
index of the scope dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (9).
Additionally, the results show that the coefficients are not significant for any of the variables that
represent each of the dimensions—technical (TEC_I), financial (FIN_I) and scope (SCO_I). This reinforces
the idea that individual donors, when donating, focus mainly on personal and emotional factors
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(awareness of need, solicitation, altruism, reputation, psychological benefits, . . . ) rather than on specific
information about projects disclosed by NGOs in their annual reports.
In relation to the control variables, two of them (the volume of incomes and fundraising
expenditure) are positive and statistically significant. This means that the higher the reputation,
the higher the amount of donations (ln I). The relationship between individual donations and the
volume of general information (FE) has a similar meaning. These positive relationships are in line
with previous literature [13,57]. On the contrary, the other two control variables (COCEN and PRICE)
are not significant. We did not detect any significant relationship between the amount of individual
donations, efficiency in the allocation of resources and financial stability.
4.3. Hypothesis 2. The Amount of Donations from Private Donors is Related to the Information Disclosed about
Projects. Therefore, This Information is Useful for the Decision-Making of Private Donors
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the models used to test H2. As can be seen in Table 5,
the coefficient of TI (1.89) is not statistically significant, either. This means that the disclosure of global
information about projects is not related to the contribution of funds by private donors. Nevertheless,
when each of the informational dimensions is incorporated into the model separately, the results
show that the coefficient of the variable scope dimension (SCO_I) (2.82) is positive and statistically
significant. Not all the information about projects disclosed by NGOs is relevant for private donors.
Only information about the scope dimension. Hypothesis 2 can be (at least partially) accepted.




Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Intercept −3.79 −4.39 −1.56 −4.15
TIt−1 1.89 – – –
TEC_It−1 – 1.90 – –
FIN_It−1 – – −0.68 –
SCO_It−1 – – – 2.82
ln It−1 1.12 *** 1.13 *** 1.03 *** 1.15 ***
PRICEt−1 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.32
FEt−1 0.37 −0.60 0.36 −0.34
CONCENt−1 −4.65 * −4.50 * −4.20 * −4.73 *
Adj. R2 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.30
Note: p-values: “***”, “**”, “*” and “.”. Significance at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. Definitions of
variables—ln PRIV_Dt = Napierian logarithm of private donations in current year, t. TIt−1 = the information
transparency index regarding the different projects carried out in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression
(3). PRICEt−1 = total expense to programme expense ratio in year t−1. ln It−1 = Napierian logarithm of the total income
obtained in year t−1. FEt−1 = total fundraising expense to total expense ratio in year t−1. TEC_It−1 = information
index of the technical dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (7). FIN_It−1 = information
index of the financial dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (8). SCO_It−1 = information
index of the scope dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (9).
The coefficient of the control variable size (ln I) is positive and statistically significant.
The interpretation of this result can be done in the same way followed in the previous section
for Hypothesis 1. However, the amount of money given by private donors is negatively related to
CONCEN (in the case of individual donors the coefficient was not statistically significant). These results
indicate that private donors take the financial stability of non-governmental organisations into
account to make donations. When NGOs depend on one or on only a few sources of income
for financing (weaker financial stability), private donors are more reluctant to donate funds.
These results are consistent with [55], who showed that nonprofits with lower concentrations of
income (lower CONCEN) had, on average, higher donations. The other two control variables (FE and
PRICE) are not statistically significant.
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4.4. Hypothesis 3. The Amount of Donations from Public Donors is Related to the Information Disclosed about
Projects. Therefore, This Information is Useful for the Decision-Making of Public Donors
Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of the models used to test H3. Like individual and
private donors, the coefficient TI (0.9) is not statistically significant. This means that the disclosure
of global information about projects is also not related to the contribution of funds by public donors.
Nevertheless, the coefficient of the financial dimension index (FIN_I) presents a positive and significant
sign (3.19). Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is (at least partially) accepted. Not all the information on
projects is relevant for public donors. Only information about financial issues. One can conclude that
the disclosure of information about projects has a positive relationship with the amount of donations.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that different kind of donors (private and public) focus their attention
on different aspects (dimensions) of the disclosed information (scope and financial respectively).
Table 6. Regression Results Public Donations.
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Intercept −9.97 * −7.68. −11.55** −8.84 *
TIt−1 0.90 – – –
TEC_It−1 – −1.21 – –
FIN_It−1 – – 3.19 –
SCO_It−1 – – – −0.42
ln It−1 1.32 *** 1.24 *** 1.40 *** 1.28 ***
PRICEt−1 0.33 0.37 0.07 0.33
FEt−1 −0.73 0.27 1.09 −0.41
CONCENt−1 2.98 3.19 2.29 3.17
Adj. R2 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.30
Note: p-values: “***”, “**”, “*” and “.” represent significance at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. Definitions of
variables—ln PUB_Dt = Napierian logarithm of private donations in current year, t. TIt−1 = the information
transparency index regarding the different projects carried out in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression
(3). PRICEt−1 = total expense to programme expense ratio in year t−1. ln It−1 = Napierian logarithm of the total income
obtained in year t−1. FEt−1 = total fundraising expense to total expense ratio in year t−1. CONCENt−1 = concentration
index in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (10). TEC_It−1 = information index of the technical
dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (7). FIN_It−1 = information index of the financial
dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (8). SCO_It−1 = information index of the scope
dimension in year t−1, calculated in accordance with expression (9).
In relation to the control variables, it should be noted that only the variable size (ln I) is positively
related to the donations made by public donors. This result was interpreted in previous sections.
Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that this variable was the only statistically significant one in all
the estimated models. Reputation is a key element for donors.
4.5. Discussion
The literature on the motivations that guide donors’ behaviour in the donation decision-making
process shows that there is a wide range of relevant factors that can be classified into two large
groups: those attributed to individuals and related to values, attitudes and behaviours [5,32,37]
and those referring to the organisation [4,14,32,39,41]. Regarding the latter, research carried out
to date has proven the usefulness of disclosed financial information in the decision-making
process [4,32,38,39,41,42]. Howbeit, some papers have recently considered whether ‘disclosing is
always better than non-disclosing’. In this vein, Abudy and Shust, through experimental analysis,
argue that accurate rules preclude firms from disclosing questionable information [58]. Furthermore,
Friedman, Hughes and Michaeli demonstrate that the strategy that an organisation follows to disclose
financial information depends on two factors: the threshold that investors have (it may be high or low),
and the availability of private information for these investors [59]. Nevertheless, only a few studies have
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addressed donation decision-making from a perspective primarily based on non-financial data and
their results are inconclusive. Evidence shows both the importance of this type of information [14,47]
and the opposite [15].
This study analysed whether non-financial information disclosed by nonprofits about activities
and social projects is useful to donors in their decision-making processes. Specifically, for individual
donors, our results indicate that there is no significant relationship between the volume of their
donations and any of the non-financial information considered. In this regard, previous research
has pointed out that non-financial disclosures do not increase actual donations [4,18,47] but they can
increase the percentage of potential donors. In line with Yetman and Yetman [13], this evidence among
individual donors could be explained due to the fact that donation decision-making differs depending
on the willingness and ability of donors to search and analyse the information. According to this,
less sophisticated donors tend to be individual donors. They seem to base their decisions more on
personal and emotional factors, as stressed by [37]. Results are also consistent with the line of reasoning
highlighted by [47]. These results are relevant because they suggest that non-financial information
about activities and projects may not always be desired or appropriate to judge the organisation.
At best, it may be due to a problem of communication and reporting by the organisations. In the worst
case, it means that there might be a disconnection between the projects and the organisational mission,
in line with existing research [60–62].
In addition, our results show that only information about results and goals reached in the projects
is taken into account by private donors to make decisions about offering financial support to NGOs.
These results are consistent with [40] who revealed that charities believed that “donors place more
importance on programme content and outcomes than on the reputation of the organisation in the community”
when making decisions about whom to donate to. The positive sign of the relation detected allows us
to conclude that more information results in a greater volume of donations.
Finally, the third hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the information with a
greater amount of financial content and the amount of donations made by public donors. The results
show that public donors use the financial information of projects more than other aspects to make
decisions about giving subsidies. This is not surprising since government organizations play a role
in the distribution of wealth and must ensure the correct use of public funds, including those for
non-profit organizations. This is why public organisations need to know how the funds allocated to
each project are managed. Our results are consistent with those of those studies that argue that donors
reward nonprofits that disclose large amounts of financial and performance information [17,63,64].
Furthermore, our results do not necessarily collide with those of [19], who do not detect any significant
relationship between the financial information disclosed and the donations. These authors and,
in general, all the works in previous literature, have analysed the donations as a whole, whilst our
paper split those donations depending on the source from which they come.
5. Concluding Remarks and Further Research
This work analysed whether non-financial information disclosed by nonprofits about activities
and social projects is useful to donors in their decision-making processes. The raison d’être of these
nonprofits is justified by the projects they carry out and therefore, ultimately, we analysed whether
donors’ motivations are guided more by values and social returns than by economic reasons.
In the analysis performed, we tested whether the information disclosed about projects has
an influence on the level of donations received by the nonprofit. To do so, three informational
dimensions of this disclosure were taken into consideration: technical (description of the projects),
financial (financial aspects of each of the projects) and scope (outcomes and impact of the project).
Additionally, individual, private and public donors were studied separately. The empirical study used
data for the year 2015 which was published by organisations that belong to the Spanish Development
NGO Coordinator.
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Overall results show that even within the same group of stakeholders, such as that of donors,
needs for information disclosed by NGOs vary according to the analytical skills or priorities of each
collective. This study’s findings suggest that each donor profile focuses its interest on a specific aspect
to make actual donations and, therefore, they raise the question as to whether nonprofits should rethink
their communication and reporting. Perhaps the one-for-all reporting model for activities and social
projects, the most common among Spanish nonprofits, should be replaced by a more flexible reporting
model allowing different data to be communicated to different users.
This opens up an avenue for future research on the usefulness in the decision-making of
non-financial information in general, and of information covering social projects in nonprofits in
particular. We are currently witnessing a great deal of interest in measuring and disclosing information
about the social impact of all the different sectors (business, government, nonprofit, social enterprises,
researchers). There is an abundance of studies and professional practices oriented towards calculating
the impact generated fundamentally by organisations with social purposes. In essence, they correspond
to the positive perception of the managers of these organisations as to the usefulness of this information
for stakeholders. But do stakeholders share the same perception? Empirical evidence about the
usefulness of this information for social investors or impact investors (donors, volunteers, beneficiaries,
etc.) is still scarce and the results are controversial. There is still a long way to go to fill this
expectation gap.
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